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ARGUMENT 
L UTAH HAS ESTABLISHED A STATUTORY SCHEME IN WHICH 
EXHAUSTION IS CONTEMPLATED. 
As set forth in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's ("State 
Farm") opening brief, the underinsured motorist ("UIM") exhaustion clause at issue here 
mirrors Utah's UIM statutory framework. Appellant Tavis McArthur contends that 
exhaustion is not required by Utah Statute. (See Appellant's Opening Brief at 21-22.) 
However, there need not be specific and direct statutory authorization in order for a 
policy provision to be valid. This is made clear by the certified question before this 
Court, which asks whether exhaustion clauses are contrary to the State's public policy, 
and not whether Utah law specifically requires such clauses. 
Under Utah law, an insurance policy is construed in accordance with traditional 
contract law principles. Alf v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 
(Utah 1993); AOK Lands, Inc. v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 860 P.2d 924 (Utah 1993). 
Accordingly, if the language in a policy is clear and unambiguous, that language is given 
"its usual and ordinary meaning." Alf, 850 P.2d at 1274 (citing Fire Ins. Exch. v. Alsop, 
D.C., 709 P.2d 389, 390 (Utah 1985); Utah Farm Bureau v. Orville, 685 P.2d 1308, 1309 
(Utah 1983)). An insurer is entitled to "include in a policy any number of kind of 
exceptions and limitations to which an insured will agree unless contrary to statute or 
public policy." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1985). Moreover, 
this Court has expressed an unwillingness to make modifications to the terms of an 
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insurance policy in the absence of specific legislative direction to do so. See Allen v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.. 839 P.2d 798, 804-05 (Utah 1992). 
There is no legislative statement against exhaustion clauses in the state of Utah. 
Indeed, the statutory scheme established by Utah's legislature anticipates exhaustion of 
liability coverage as a precondition to the recovery of UIM benefits. First, an 
underinsured vehicle is defined as one that "has insufficient liability coverage to 
compensate fully the injured party for all special and general damages." Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-22-305.3 (l)(b). Accordingly, a premise for UIM coverage is that the insured's 
damages exceed the tortfeasor's policy limits. The Utah Code then explains that the 
inception of loss on a UIM claim is the date of the last liability payment, and that a UIM 
carrier must not decide whether to waive its subrogation claim until five days after all 
liability limits have been tendered. See Utah Code Ann. §§31A-22-305.3(4) and 
305.3(5)(a). The implication of these provisions is that a UIM claim does not arise until 
the available liability limits have been exhausted, and that an exhaustion clause is not 
contrary to the public policy established by the statute. 
Mr. McArthur makes much of the fact that the only specific statutory reference to 
the liability limits is in the context of the subrogation provision. He delves into the 
history of an insurer's subrogation rights and contends that such a right is "of nearly no 
value to the UIM carrier . . . ." (See Appellant's Opening Brief at 22-25.) Such a claim 
is certainly debatable. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48,1fl8, 89 
P.3d 97 (Utah 2003) ("insurer also has a legitimate interest in preventing collusive 
settlements that would foreclose its right to recover from a solvent tortfeasor through 
2 
subrogation"). More importantly, however, is that Mr. McArthur's argument misses the 
point. State Farm does not justify its position solely on the protection of its subrogation 
rights. Rather, State Farm relies primarily upon the subrogation scheme as an indicator 
of when a UIM claim is ripe in Utah and whether an exhaustion clause can be said to 
violate the statutory expression of public policy. It would make little sense for the 
legislature to establish the tendering of liability limits as a trigger for the subrogation 
waiver countdown if it did not consider exhaustion to be a precondition to the availability 
of UIM coverage. Otherwise, the legislature simply could have indicated that the UIM 
carrier has five days from the date the settlement offer is accepted to determine whether it 
wished to waive its subrogation rights. 
Mr. McArthur refers to several western states that have rejected exhaustion clauses 
despite defining UIM coverage with reference to policy limits. (See Appellant's Opening 
Brief at 28-33.) What those states have done is irrelevant in light of Utah's clearly 
established precedent of enforcing policy provisions absent a statutory expression of 
public policy that conflicts with those provisions. The question before this court is not 
what the public policy is in other states, but whether exhaustion clauses are contrary to 
Utah's public policy. Furthermore, the statutory language from those states does not go 
as far in approving exhaustion as Utah's statutory language does. Each of the statutes 
relied upon by Mr. McArthur simply defines underinsured vehicles as vehicles for which 
the owner's liability limits are insufficient to fully compensate the insured for his or her 
damages. (See id.) Those states do not follow Utah's statutory scheme and include 
provisions that make the subrogation process contingent on the exhaustion of all liability 
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limits as well as defining the date of inception of the UIM loss as the date the last liability 
payment is made. 
Mr. McArthur also discusses the fact that several western states have protected an 
insurer's subrogation rights, yet invalidated exhaustion clauses. (See Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 33-35.) Once again, that point is inapposite, as the protection of 
subrogation rights is just one of a number of policy considerations raised by State Farm 
in this instance. Moreover, those states apparently lack any statutory language that starts 
the subrogation waiver-clock ticking upon the tendering of liability limits. See id. As 
such, unlike Utah, those subrogation schemes are not based on the premise of exhaustion. 
Mr. McArthur cites the Oregon case of Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 95 (Ore. 
1996), as an example of a state with a similar subrogation scheme that nevertheless 
invalidated exhaustion clauses. However, at the time Vega was decided, Oregon's 
current subrogation scheme was not in place. See id, It was after that decision that 
Oregon revised its statute to indicate that UIM benefits do not apply unless the applicable 
liability benefits have been exhausted or the insured gives a credit to the insurer "for the 
unrealized portion of the described liability limits" and the insurer's subrogation rights 
have been protected. See ORS § 742.504(4)(d). As such, Oregon's current scheme is 
clearly distinguishable from Utah's scheme, which does not establish a credit of the 
unrealized liability limits as an alternative to exhaustion. 
Mr. McArthur also cites Florida as the other example of a state whose statute 
mentions "liability limits" in the subrogation context yet rejects exhaustion clauses. (See 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 36-37.) It is true that at the time New Hampshire Ins. Co. 
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v. Knight 506 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1987) was decided, Florida statute indicated * that a UIM 
carrier has thirty days from when the injured party settles a claim with the liability insurer 
for the liability limits to decide whether to approve the settlement and waive its 
subrogation rights. See Knight, 506 So.2d 75, 76-77 (Fla. 1987). However, in rejecting 
the argument that such language justified an exhaustion clause, the Knight court noted 
that Florida statute also explained that UIM coverage was "'over and above but shall not 
duplicate the benefits available to an insured.'" Id. at 77 (quoting Abberton v. Colonial 
Penn Ins. Co., 421 So.2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1983). The language relied upon by the Knight and 
Abberton courts was an affirmative statement by the Florida legislature that UIM benefits 
were dependent on the availability of liability benefits, not the recovery of such benefits. 
There has been no such statement by the Utah legislature. 
In a number of other jurisdictions where there is statutory support for exhaustion 
clauses, such as there is in Utah, courts have enforced those clauses. See Lindsey v. 
Southern Farm Bureau, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249-51 (W.D. Ark. 2009); Curran v. 
Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 829, 834 (Alaska 2001); Farmers Ins. Exch. 
v. Hurley, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 697 (Cal. App. 4th 1999); Daniels v. Johnson; 509 S.E.2d 41 
(Ga. 1998); Lemna v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 652 N.E.2d 482 (111. App. 3d 1995); In 
re Fed. Ins. Co. v. Watnick, 607 N.E.2d 771 (N.Y. 1992); Continental Ins. Co. v. Cebe-
Habersky, 571 A.2d 104 (Conn. 1990). Those courts have recognized that when a state's 
statutory scheme makes it clear that UIM coverage is intended to act as excess coverage, 
1
 The current statute no longer includes the same reference to the liability limits, but 
instead indicates that if the settlement is for less than the full liability limits, the UIM 
carrier shall be given a credit for the liability carrier's limits. See Fla. Stat. § 627.727(6) 
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available only when the tortfeasor's liability insurance is insufficient, then an exhaustion 
requirement is consistent with that approach. See e^ g. Cumm, 29 P.3d at 832-33. 
In Lindsey, the plaintiffs argued that they should be entitled to UIM benefits 
despite their policy's exhaustion requirements and the fact that they had not recovered the 
liability limits under the tortfeasor's policy. In ruling against the plaintiffs, the court 
noted that the general rule in Arkansas was that the tortfeasor's liability limits had to be 
paid in full before an insured was eligible for UIM benefits. Id. at 1249. That rule was 
based primarily on the Arkansas UIM statute which states that UIM coverage applies 
"whenever the liability insurance limits of such other owner or operator are less than the 
amount of the damages incurred by the insured." Id. The Arkansas courts found, as a 
corollary to that statute, that the extent of the insured's damages must be determined and 
the liability limits of the tortfeasor's carrier must be paid in full before it can be decided 
whether the insured is actually underinsured. Id. at 1249. 
Similarly, the Daniels court held that exhaustion was implied by Georgia's 
statutory scheme. That court found that the statute contemplated exhaustion by defining 
UIM coverage as "'the difference between the available coverages under the bodily 
injury liability insurance . . . and the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage.'" 
Daniels, 509 S.E.2d at 42 (citing Georgia statute). The court also relied upon another 
statutory provision that permits claimants to settle with the tortfeasor's carrier for the 
limits of the policy and to grant that carrier a limited release without compromising 
claims under any other policies. Id. at 43. 
6 
In light of the above provisions, the court disagreed with the proposition that a 
settlement for less than policy requirements would satisfy the exhaustion requirement. 
The court then noted that "it is within the province of the legislature to consider whether 
a party who settles with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier for less than the policy amount 
may thereafter pursue his own carrier." Id. 
Utah has established a UIM statutory scheme under which the exhaustion of 
liability benefits is contemplated. Exhaustion clauses such as the one at issue are 
consistent with that scheme and therefore cannot be contrary to public policy. Had the 
legislature perceived a significant problem with exhaustion clauses, it would have taken 
the opportunity to address those concerns. 
II. THE EXHAUSTION CLAUSE IS A FUNDAMENTAL PRECONDITION 
TO COVERAGE THAT PROMOTES MULTIPLE INTERESTS. 
Mr. McArthur also contends that the exhaustion clause at issue is a technical 
penalty that violates the interests of the insured.2 (See Appellant's Opening Brief at 16.) 
In making that argument, Mr. McArthur ignores the fundamental purpose of UIM 
coverage, which is to provide affordable, secondary and supplemental coverage, not 
alternative liability coverage. See Lindsev, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1249; Quran, 29 P.3d at 
835-36; Castle v. Williamsen. 453 S.E.2d 624 (W. Va. 1994). Exhaustion requirements 
simply act as a threshold, helping ensure that an insured is in need of such supplemental 
In support of that argument, Mr. McArthur has referred to a number of "facts" relating 
to his injuries and the factors behind his underlying settlement. (See Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 10-13, 19.) Such allegations were stricken by the District Court and 
are not a part of the record. (R. at 62-64.) Mr. McArthur's reliance on, and citation to, 
that information is therefore improper. 
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coverage. See Lindsev, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1249; Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison. 536 
A.2d 199, 202 (N.H. 1987). 
The primary insurers normally put forth the effort in "conducting] the 
investigation, negotiation, and defense of all claims." Curran, 29 P.3d at 835-36. If an 
insured is permitted to effectively bypass liability insurance by settling with the liability 
carrier for less than its limits, then the UIM carrier will be required to undertake a good 
portion of the investigation, negotiation and defense that is normally conducted by the 
liability carrier. Such would defeat the design and intent of UIM coverage. See id. 
Therefore, contrary to Mr. McArthur's representations, State Farm and other UIM 
carriers indeed have a legitimate economic interest in the enforcement of exhaustion 
clauses. Insureds also have such an interest, as they would face higher premiums due to 
the increased costs borne by UIM carriers if exhaustion was not required. 
Mr. McArthur has string-cited a group of cases, representing twenty-three 
jurisdictions, to establish that a majority of courts have held the exhaustion clause to be 
void.3 (See Appellant's Opening Brief at 20-21.) However, he has failed to show how 
each of those states have public policies that are similar to those in Utah. 
Furthermore, at least nine of those cases did not actually find exhaustion clauses 
unenforceable. Several of them involved situations where there was no exhaustion clause 
in the policy, or the appellate court had no such clause on the record to review, so the 
court simply decided that the UIM statute did not require exhaustion. See Cobb v. 
Benjamin, 482 S.E.2d 589 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Metcalf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
3
 Mr. McArthur cites Cobb v. Benjamin twice in the string. 
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Co., 944 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Leal v. Northwestern Nat'l County Mut. Ins. 
Co., 846 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105 
(Okla. 1991); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Faris, 536 N.E.2d 1097 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989). 
Three other cases relied upon by Plaintiff do not directly address the issue of exhaustion. 
See Linebaugh v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 569 N.W.2d 648 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); 
Barrett v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 685 A.2d 975 (N.J. Super. 1996); Hamilton v. 
Farmers Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 213 (Wash. 1987). In addition, LeFranc v. Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co., 594 A.2d 382, 384 (R.I. 1991), actually held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to 
UIM coverage because they had failed to exhaust the liability limits and therefore the 
tortfeasor could not be considered underinsured.4 
Additionally, at least two of the cases were decided based on the fact that the 
exhaustion clause was directly contrary to state statute. See Vega, 918 P.2d at 95 
(exhaustion provision violated "no less favorable" requirement of model statutory 
policy); Brown v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 17 Kan. App. 2d 547, 549 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) 
(clause unenforceable because not included in list of permissible exclusions set forth by 
statute). And as discussed in the section above, Vega, has since been superseded by 
statute. See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Conner, 182 P.3d 878, 887, n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) 
(noting that the statutory amendment overturned the decision in Vega "which held that an 
LeFranc has since been superseded by a statute that now specifically indicates that the 
release of the tortfeasor does not extinguish the underinsured claim, regardless of whether 
the claim against the tortfeasor has been liquidated. See Sunderland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
717 A.2d 53, 55 (R.I. 1998); see also R.L Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.1(h). Utah clearly does not 
have any such statutory authority. 
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insured was entitled to proceed directly against his or her own insurer for UIM coverage 
without first exhausting the limits of the underinsured tortfeasor's coverage.") 
Accordingly, of the twenty-three jurisdictions relied upon by Mr. McArthur, 
nearly half of them either did not specifically invalidate exhaustion clauses, or only did 
so because they were directly contrary to statute. Although State Farm recognizes that 
some states have found exhaustion clauses to be contrary to public policy, "a significant 
minority of courts without statutory authority strictly uphold exhaustion clauses in UIM 
contracts, generally relying on freedom of contract principles." Curran, 29 P.3d at 834, 
n.30 (listing courts) (emphasis added). See Robinette v. Am. Liberty Ins. Co., 720 F. 
Supp. 577 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Danbeck v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 605 N.W.2d 925 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1999); Ploen v. Union Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 436 (Neb. 1998); Castle, 453 
S.E.2d at 624; Lewis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 857 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1993); Morrison, 536 A.2d at 202. Such principles are also an important part of Utah 
public policy. See e ^ Salt Lake County v. Hollidav Water Co., 2010 UT 45,1ffl36, 38, 
234 P.3d 1105. 
More importantly, as set forth in the section above, in those jurisdictions such as 
Utah where there is statutory support for exhaustion clauses, courts enforce those clauses 
almost unanimously. See Curran, 29 P.3d at 834, n.30. 
Furthermore, as set forth in State Farm's opening brief, there are several other 
policy considerations that weigh in favor of upholding exhaustion clauses, including 
preserving UIM coverage as an affordable, secondary coverage; protecting an insurer's 
subrogation rights and maintaining clarity under the current statutory scheme; and 
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preventing a slippery slope by which insureds are ultimately permitted to recover UIM 
benefits despite settling for a nominal amount with the liability carrier. (See State Farm's 
Opening Brief at 10-11.) 
Mr. McArthur contends that inasmuch as UIM coverage is mandatory unless 
waived by the insured, that exhaustion clauses are per-se invalid. (See Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 40.) However, this Court has recognized that "[wjhere the statutory 
scheme allows consumers the option of refusing coverage altogether, it is difficult to see 
how a policy exclusion that simply attaches conditons to coverage could be 
unenforceable as against public policy." See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 
P.3d 97,116 (Utah 2003). 
Mr. McArthur further claims that "Utah's strong public policy to encourage 
settlement and discourage litigation supports vitiation of the exhaustion clause." (See 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 40.) That same argument was advanced by the insured in 
Danbeck in an attempt to overcome the plain language of the exhaustion clause. The 
Danbeck court found that such a public policy rationale was insufficient to overcome the 
contract's unambiguous terms. Danbeck, 605 N.W.2d at 929-30. The court noted that 
the Wisconsin cases which established the public policy in favor of settlement did not 
relate that policy to any public policies pertaining to UIM insurance. Therefore, the court 
stated that 
in absence of an argument, specific to UIM insurance, explaining why the 
plain language of the clause is inconsistent with Wisconsin public policy as 
expressed by the legislature or by the supreme court, we decline to rely on a 
generalized policy favoring settlements to override the plain language of 
the exhaustion clause. 
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Id. at 930. As did the plaintiff in Danbeck, Mr. McArthur has failed to cite any UIM 
insurance cases in which such a correlation was drawn with the general public policy in 
favor of settlement. Moreover, the policy in favor of settlement is not intended to compel 
a UIM carrier to give up its rights in order to facilitate a settlement between two other 
parties. 
Moreover, Mr. McArthur's rationale does not necessarily promote the policy of 
encouraging settlement, it just shifts the focus. Voiding the exhaustion requirement 
would simply transfer the bulk of the litigation from the liability claim to the UIM claim. 
As noted above, the purpose of UIM coverage is to provide affordable, secondary and 
supplemental coverage, not alternative liability coverage. If an insured is allowed to 
bypass liability insurance by settling with the liability carrier for less than its limits, then 
the UIM carrier will be required to undertake a good portion of the investigation, 
negotiation and defense that is normally conducted by the liability carrier. Furthermore, 
there is no guarantee that the UIM carrier and the claimant will be able to agree "on the 
amount of the credit, or the facial policy limits and "add-ons" . . .." Curran, 29 P.3d at 
836, n.36 (Alaska 2001). As such, allowing insureds to settle for less than liability limits 
could invite additional litigation, see id., and not ultimately promote the public policy of 
settlement. 
Mr. McArthur also expresses concern over a situation in which UIM benefits may 
be unjustly denied because multiple negligent parties are involved, and one of the 
negligent party's percentage of fault is small, making it impossible to exhaust that party's 
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policy limits. (See Appellant's Opening Brief at 17-18.) Such a situation is purely 
hypothetical, as this case involves only one tortfeasor. This Court has consistently 
refused to issue advisory opinions when "there exists no more than a difference of 
opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a provision to a situation in which the 
parties might, at some future time, find themselves." See Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 
2009 UT 52, Tf 29, 215 P.3d 933 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Mr. McArthur's incomplete hypothetical involves a number of variables that are not 
before this Court and it should therefore have no impact on this Court's decision. 
It should also be noted that the exhaustion clause at issue only implicates "the 
limits of liaiblity of all bodily injury liability bonds and policies that apply . . , ." (R. at 
14.) If a joint tortfeasor's responsibility is limited to an amount that is less than the 
liaiblity limit, then that liability limit would not "apply" and therefore exhaustion would 
not be expected of that policy. Furthermore, UIM coverage may not even be at issue with 
respect to that tortfeasor because an underinsured vehicle is one "whose limits of liaiblity 
for bodily injury liability are less than the amount of the insured's damages . . . ." (R. at 
14.) As such, to use Mr. McArthur's hypothetical, a tortfeasor with $300,000 in liability 
limits whose percentage of fault is only 10% would not qualify as underinsured because 
had that tortfeasor's full liability limits applied, they would have been sufficient to cover 
the insured's damages. 
As recognized by the number of courts which have upheld exhaustion clauses, 
such clauses advance a number of benefits. Those benefits outweigh the concerns 
expressed by Mr. McArthur. Furthermore, even if there are legitimate concerns with 
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exhaustion clauses, it is the role of the legislature to address and resolve those issues. See 
e.g. Allen, 839 P.2d at 804-05. The exhaustion clause at issue is a clear and 
unambiguous, freely bargained for provision that reflects Utah's UIM statutory scheme 
and promotes multiple interests. As such, it is not contrary to Utah's public policy and is 
therefore enforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, and in State Farm's opening brief, this Court 
should answer the certified questions by finding that exhuastion clauses are enforceable 
under Utah law and that no showing of economic prejudice is required to uphold such 
clauses. J-, 
DATED this X ' day of March, 2011 
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